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The Constitutional Right to Education:
The Quiet Revolution
By PAUL R. DiMoND*
THERE has already been much talk of a crisis in American educa-
tion, perhaps too much talk. There are continuing and loud debates
about the effects of schooling, permissiveness, freedom, student fights,
choice, diversity, aid to parochial schools, community control, equality
of educational opportunity, and quality education. In recent years, how-
ever, the debates have increasingly focused upon, or more accurately
have been wholly enveloped by, the heat generated by the battles over
desegregation, busing, neighborhood schools, school finance, and local
control. Perhaps, it is a mark of our constitutional democracy, or the
litigious nature of the American people, or their lawyers, that each has
been the subject of recent constitutional adjudication.' Yet all of these
* B.A. Amherst College, 1966; J.D., University of Michigan, 1969; Co-operating
Attorney, Children's Defense Fund; formerly Staff Attorney, Center for Law
and Education, Harvard University. The author wishes to express his apprecia-
tion to Marian Wright Edelman, David Kirp, Mark Yudof, Thomas Gilhool,
Michael Altman, Stan Herr, and John Reed, fellow colleagues and counsel, who
have done much to begin the thought and action which is the subject of this article.
The draft of this article was written pursuant to a grant from the Office of Economic
Opportunity, Washington, D.C. 20506. The opinions expressed herein are those of the
author and should not be construed as representing the opinions or policy of any
agency of the United States Government. Some of the ideas for this article were
treated in summary fashion in a general discussion of The Law of School Classification,
12 INFQuALrrY IN EDUCATION 30 (1972). Perhaps, Professor Kirp deserves credit for
first coining and then applying the term "classification" to all variety of school sort-
ing practices: any grouping decision is subject to constitutional analysis under both the
equal protection and due process clauses as to legitimacy and procedural fairness.
E.g., Kiup, Schools as Sorters: Classification Practices and Constitutional Principles
[Forthcoming U. PA. L. REv.].
1. E.g., Bradley v. State Bd. of Educ., 41 U.S.L.W. 4685 (U.S. May 21, 1973);
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 41 U.S.L.Q. 4407 (U.S. March 21,
1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenbuerg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Gaston
County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Haney v. County 1Bd. of Educ., 410
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conflicting and emotional currents2 should pale before the undeniable
fact that hundreds of thousands of youngsters are excluded from all
publicly supported schooling, are wrongly assigned to special education
classes, or are confined without proper treatment in residential institu-
tions. For these largely ignored children, the crisis in American educa-
tion is more fundamental; it is a matter of total noneducation or mis-
education.
It is the purpose of this article to show, first, the precise contours
of the limited constitutional right to education which can be invoked
to protect these heretofore neglected children. It will also be shown
how the vindication of this right by courts, and its implementation
by public officials under pressure from citizens, can effect a revolution
in American education. Such a revolution holds a realistic promise
of benefit not only to the excluded child directly, but to all children
by reforming the entire system of American public education.3
F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969); Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971),
345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.
Ill. 1968), aff'd sub nom. mem., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd
sub norn., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Serrano v. Priest, 5
Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). This apparent spate of recent
litigation could be interpreted as a continuing manifestation of either the default of
public leadership, the ill will of the majority, or the vigorous clashes of diverse ideals.
Most of these issues have long been the subject of constitutional adjudication. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629
(1950); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938); Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Gong Lum
v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927); Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
2. Whether any of this judicial inquiry and often ensuing intervention has
accomplished anything significant is itself a subject of considerable debate. E.g.,
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLI-
TICS & FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1961); Cohen & Dimond, Judicial Involvement in Public
Schooling, PROTECTING THE FAMILY'S INTEREST IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, O.E. STUDY
CONTRACT, CG-8542-A/1 (1971); Kirp, The Role of Law in Educational Policy, SOCIAL
POLICY, Sept.-Oct. 1971, at 42; Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits
of Constitutional Jurisprudence Undefined, 35 U. CI. L. REv. 583 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Kurland].
3. In the face of such gradiose claims, the reader does not need the author's
warning to be skeptical of what follows. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 2, at 596-600.
The reader, however, should be aware that I am involved in litigation to secure the
constitutional right to education here defined. Commentators, more in the academic
tradition, may therefore chide my bias, if not scholarship. Goldstein, Interdistrict In-
equalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis of Serrano v. Priest and Its
Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 504, 512 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein]. Op-
posing counsel no doubt may inform their clients and courts that what follows is
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Those who doubt the reality of this latest "crisis"4 in American
education should consider the following evidence suggesting the depri-
vation of all educational opportunity to some children. In Pennsyl-
vania, as many as 50,000 retarded children were excluded from school
entirely at the time of filing suit;5 in New Orleans, school authorities
admit that over 500 "mentally handicapped" children received no edu-
cation from any public agency, while, quite literally, countless others
are denied access to education.' Across the country, as many as 60
percent of school age children who are retarded may not be receiving
an education.7 In Washington, D.C., more than 12,000 and perhaps
as many as 18,000 youngsters, with various real or school-imagined
handicaps, were denied all education at the time of filing suit;8 in Mas-
sachusetts, several hundred emotionally disturbed children sit only on
waiting lists and countless others are excluded from all education and
merely another polemic on behalf of the latest "cause." In any event, the issue for
every reader who happens upon this article remains: what, if anything, said herein is
right enough to require action by the reader in the forum in which he operates. Some
of these thoughts, and cruel facts, have already required courts to grant relief. E.g.,
Lebanks v. Spears, Civil No. 71-2897 (E.D. La. 1973); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348
F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
modifying, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala.), modifying, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.
Ala. 1971); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Pennsylvania
Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972),
modifying, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Nosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316
(D.V.I. 1970); Knight v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 115 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), modifying,
48 F.R.D. 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
4. There is a crisis for a child denied an education, even if he is the only one in
such position.
5. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
279, 296 n.53 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Figures on how many children are effectively ex-
cluded from school are only estimates, primarily because local and state officials fail
to count all the children of school-age in any community. Excluded children, es-
pecially, are so neglected that they usually are not even counted. The figures here
cited, therefore, are based either on admissions contained in defendant school au-
thorities' reports, or on estimates derived by subtracting the number of children
counted as provided an education from the federal census, or on various incidence rate
figures. See, e.g., D. STEDm N & D. SHERWOOD, HYPo-nrcmAL COMMUNITY (1967).
6. New Orleans' school authorities reported that as of January 1, 1972, some
655 "mentally handicapped" children were "legally excluded" from the schools of
Orleans Parish school district and were not provided an alternative, publicly supported
education. Lebanks v. Spears, Civil No. 71-2897 (E.D. La. 1973). After surveying
children recommended, but not placed in "special classes," New Orleans school offi-
cials reported another 2,000 school age children were without schooling. March 18,
1973 Proposal for Expansion of Special Classes, Orleans Parish, on file with Paul R.
Dimond.
7. PRESIDENT'S Comm. ON MENTAL R-TARDATXON, MR 69, TOWARD PROgRess:
THE STORY OF A DECADE, at 18 (1969).
8. See, Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972).
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treatment.' Exclusion of children from school is a national problem
and scandal. 10
Countless other children in special schools and institutions across
the land receive no education or treatment, while others are provided
a wholly inappropriate "special education." For example, many se-
verely retarded persons from Pennsylvania" to Alabama 2 have been
institutionalized without provision for any program of education and
training, and perhaps in environments unfit for living things.' 3 At
the same time, some special education classes are filled with children
who are not retarded and are only learning that their place in life is
to be retarded.'
4
In Boston, for example, black, poor and Spanish-speaking young-
sters were placed disproportionately in "special" classes. When they
were re-evaluated by sound methods of diagnosis by competent child
psychiatrists and psychologists, over 50 percent were found to be nor-
mal.' Similar discoveries were made upon examination and re-evalu-
9. In Massachusetts and Boston particularly, exclusion of many variously handi-
capped and perfectly "normal" children is a well-documented problem. See, e.g.,
MASSACHUSEITS STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR HANDICAPPED AND Dis-
ADVANTAGED CHILDREN 215-270 (1971); SUFFER THE CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF
MENTAL HEALTH IN MASSACHUSETTS 11-14 (1972); THE WAY WE Go TO SCHOOL:
THE EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN IN BOSTON (1970).
10. An HEW study team concluded: "Through legal, quasi-legal and extra-
legal devices, or through apathy, schools cause, encourage and welcome the lack of
attendance in school of millions of American youngsters. Such activity by the edu-
cational system serves as a denial of civil rights as massive as the separate school
systems maintained by law in prior years." J. REGAL, R. ELLIOT, H. GROSSMAN &
W. MORSE, THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN FROM SCHOOL 8 (1971).
Throughout this article, the term "exclusion" is used in a nontechnical sense to refer
to any continued absence from publicly supported educational opportunity,
Preliminary analysis of the 1970 United States Census suggests that of children
ages 7-15 from 700 thousand to 1.2 million children (1.9 to 3.2% of all children) were
neither enrolled in any school or institution for the spring of 1970. Michelson,
"Children Not in School-Preliminary Estimate" (Feb. 1973), on file with Paul R.
Dimond.
11. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
279, 296-97 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
12. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
13. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Similar
allegations have been made in Ricci v. Greenblatt, Civil No. 72-469F (E.D. Mass.)
and New York Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, Civil No. 72-356 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
14. E.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THE SIx HOUR RE-
TARDED CHILD (1970). This title refers to the many children who are labeled, and
apparently act, "retarded" only at school; in the real environment outside the school,
many are as adaptive and innovative as the rest of our children.
15. Stewart v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass., filed Oct. 1970) (mo-
1090 [Vol. 24
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ation of the disproportionate placement of Spanish-speaking and black
children in San Francisco.:6 In Washington, D.C., upon retesting the
children assigned to the basic tracks, over two-thirds were found to
be misclassified.17  Based on a recent examination of several school
systems in metropolitan Philadelphia, at least 25 percent and perhaps
as many as 68 percent of the children assigned to classes for the "Edu-
cable Mentally Retarded" should be in regular classes. 18 Finally, many
children with quite specific and devastating medical problems are
lumped into various special education classes or are excluded from
school altogether instead of being given the medical evaluation and
treatment necessary to provide a cure. 19
tion to dismiss denied and submission of plan required, Feb. 8, 1971). See also
CENTER FOR LAw AND EDUCATION, CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS 234 (1972) [herein-
after cited as CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS].
16. Diana v. California State Bd. of Educ., C-70-37 R.F.D. (N.D. Cal., filed
Feb. 1970) (consent decree); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
see, CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS, supra note 15, at 292, 321. Some view these cases
as attacks on the tyranny of the verbal portion of I.Q. tests, which are "biased"
against minority groups unfamiliar with the "primary language." Such a narrow view
of these cases is wrong. The courts in these cases prevented disproportionate place-
ment of minority groups in the category "retarded" only if the nonverbal portions of
the tests were also included as part of the illegitimate "primary language"; these deci-
sions reform school placement practices more generally only if a broad senstivity to
varying personal and cultural conditions is substituted for sole reliance on any test.
See Stewart v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass., filed Oct. 1970). At a
minimum, no child should be labelled or viewed as "retarded" unless he has signifi-
cantly lower intellectual function (more than two standard deviations below the norm
on individually administered I.Q. tests) and is impaired in actual, nonschool social
behavior relative to the child's cultural context. Both should be measured by a com-
petent child psychologist and only in conjunction with other professionals, including a
qualified clinical social worker and developmental disability teacher. The "school psy-
chologist" should not be permitted to make these decisions in isolation from other
views of the child. See generally GROSSMAN, MANUAL ON TERMINOLOGY AND CLASS-
IFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION (1973); Mercer affidavit, CLASSIFICATION MA-
TERtALS, supra note 15; L. TERMAN & T. MERULL, STANFORD BINET INTELLIGENCE
SCALE (1960); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, THE PROBLEM OP
MENTAL RETARDATON (1969); D. WECHSLER, THE MEASUREMENT AND APPRAISAL
OF ADULT INTELLIGENCE (1969); Herber, A Manual of Terminology and Classification
in Mental Retardation, 65 AM. J. MENT. DEF. 1961 (1964).
17. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
18. Garrison & Hammill, Who are the Retarded?, EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN, Sept.
1971, at 18. See also Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,
343 F. Supp. 279, 295-97 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
19. As simple examples, consider the reading and comprehension difficulties
accompanying bad eyesight or hearing and the potential "miracle" cures of glasses or
hearing aids which are possible upon detection of the problem. As another possible
example, consider the complex controversy over drug-prescribed cures for "hyper-
activity." E.g., 8 INEQUALrrY IN EDUCATION 2-24 (1971).
May 1973]
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For all these children, the asserted birthright of every American
child to a decent educational opportunity is a total myth; whatever edu-
cation these children may ask for or need, they get nothing. Yet we
now have the knowledge and capacity to provide every child a mini-
mally adequate program of treatment, education, training, and care.
With the exception of a miniscule number of children who die before
adolescence, every child given education and training is capable of
some development.2" That makes the present plight of these children
not only an outrage, but also unacceptable and wasteful as a matter
of public policy.2' The major issue to be addressed in this article is
whether the present neglect of these children is prohibited by the
constitution as well.
The Constitutional Right to Education
Some of the children denied an education may be disadvantaged
to some extent by their own inherited or acquired mental, emotional,
or physical handicap,22 but they are twice disabled by the affirma-
tive acts and omissions of public authority. These disabilities result
20. The phrases "educable" and "trainable" are sometimes used as "technical"
labels supposedly related to the relative capacity of different children for development.
These phrases are used here only to describe the fact that all children with programs
of education, instruction, and/or training are capable of some development. Recent
developments and evidence suggest that the pessimistic views, which have been so
widely and so long entertained regarding the ineducability of the mentally defective
are unwarranted. Many of those who might be classified as feeble-minded because of
their I.Q. can live in financial and social independence under present economic cir-
cumstances provided favorable environmental conditions are present. A. YATES, BE-
HAVIOR THERAPY 324, 339 (1970); N. O'CONNOR & J. TIZARD, THE SOCIAL PROBLEM OF
MENTAL DEFICIENCY (1956). "[T]he remaining few, with such education and train-
ing, are capable of achieving some degree of self care." Pennsylvania Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified
by 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See also PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL
RETARDATION, THE Six HOUR RETARDED CHILD (1970); PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, THESE, Too, MUST BE EQUAL: AMERICA'S NEEDS IN HABILI-
TATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED (1969).
21. For example, institutional care costs about $40,000 per bed in construction
costs, and yearly maintenance of the retarded ranges from $2,000 to $10,000. PRESI-
DENT'S COMM. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, THESE, Too, MUST BE EQUAL: AMERICA'S
NEEDS IN HABILITATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 14 (1969).
Consider in contrast the earnings potential of millions of persons capable of learning
to support themselves, but who have not yet been taught. Such dollar cost-benefit
analysis fails to include the human value for the individual of a life of independence
which results from education, as compared with the abject dependence which so often
accompanies noneducation of the handicapped.
22. As noted, only some of the exculded children suffer from any real handicap;
others are only the subject of misclassification. See notes 14 & 16 supra.
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first from the effective exclusion of these children from access to
all publicly supported education and, second, from the arbitrary
and capricious process by which they are identified, labeled, and
placed. Across the country, various groups on behalf of such plain-
tiff children seek the aid of the judiciary in eradicating, root and
branch, these two state imposed disabilities. 2   Their narrow claim is
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the total eradication of these
two state imposed disabilities.
The constitutional framework for this claim is straightforward, if
not elegant. First, the unjustified exclusion of any child from all pub-
lic schooling denies to that child the equal protection of the laws when
the state makes the opportunity freely available to other children. 24 Sec-
ond, the operation of an unfair procedure in the stigmatization by pub-
lic authority of any person 25 or the denial to him of any public good2.6
denies the process due each person under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such a stigmatization and denial is involved in labeling children as "ex-
ceptional," "retarded," or "handicapped," and placing them in "special"
classes or excluding them from schooling entirely. These two rights,
equal protection and due process, merge to form the emerging constitu-
tional right to an education, which guarantees to every child a mini-
mally adequate, publicly supported educational opportunity.27
The Equal Protection Right to Some Education: Prying
Open the School House Door
In this section only the extreme case is discussed-total exclusion
from all public education. Any subtleties arising from claims of unfair
or illegitimate tracking within schools are removed. 8 Issues of differ-
23. Cf. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
24. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
26. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
27. These constitutional arguments have been accepted fully in Mills v. Board
of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 865-76 (D.D.C. 1972), and have been found to create
sufficiently colorable constitutional claims to confer jurisdiction on a federal court to
order and enforce a consent agreement establishing the right to education. Pennsyl-
vania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279, 293-97 (E.D.
Pa. 1972). In Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846, 848 (E.D. Mich. 1972), a
district court, even while dismissing a case based on the strained and simultaneous
application of the doctrines of mootness and prematurity, declared that "[t]he problem
presented to the court by this case is compelling . . . . [P]roviding education for
some children, while not providing education for others [in this instance, handicapped
children] is a denial of equal protection."
28. For example, in Stewart v. Phillips, Civil No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass., filed
MVay 1973] RIGHT TO EDUCATION
ential education fit for the child's special needs similarly are cast
aside 9.2  The ever-lurking claim of racial discrimination inherent in
school classifications which overrepresent black and other minority
children in "inferior" ability groups and underrepresent them in "su-
perior" groups and curricula are basically irrelevant.3 0 Even the sim-
ple right to acquire useful knowledge while in school is beside the
point. 3 1  The classification here considered is simple: one group of
children is effectively excluded by various state actions from all pub-
licly supported education,3 2 while the states regularly make the oppor-
tunity of some education available free to others. The issue is whether
the states, having undertaken to provide public education to some chil-
dren, may justify its total denial to others.
Standards for Judicial Review of Challenged Classifications
The standards of review applied by the Supreme Court to various
challenged classifications have long been the subject of commentary. 3
Generally, constitutional scholars suggest that there is now a dichotomy
in judicial review depending upon the nature and impact of the classi-
Oct. 1970), defendants' motion to dismiss a complaint attempting to reform special
education placements was denied on the ground that a fair hearing was required before
labeling a child retarded or placing him in any special class. See notes 74-106 and
accompanying text infra.
29. In Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
279 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the court approved the consent agreement stating: "It is the
commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded child in a free, public pro-
gram of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity, within the context
of a presumption that, among the alternative programs of education and training re-
quired by statute to be available, placement in a regular public school class is prefer-
able to placement in a special public school class ...... See notes 110-24 and ac-
companying text infra.
30. See, e.g., Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir.
1971); Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La. 1971);
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967).
31. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Thus, even the troublesome
issue of the propriety of disciplinary exclusion is omitted. The child, arguendo, may
be banished from a particular school or classroom; the issue is whether he may also
be entirely denied access to homework, tutoring, correspondence courses, rehabilita-
tion and the like.
32. The term "education" refers to any developmental training, instruction, or
indoctrination to which children are or can be subjected in public and private schools
and agencies-ranging from the three R's to communication to toilet training.
33. See, e.g., J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH & PUBLIC
EDUCATION (1971) [hereinafter cited as COONS]; Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 344-56 (1949). Compare Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Mayer v. Chi-
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fication challenged. Restrained review-a search only for a rational
relationship to a legitimate state purpose--usually finds sufficient justi-
fication to sustain a classification. But where the classification is "sus-
pect" or impacts upon a "fundamental interest," especially a constitu-
tionally protected freedom, strict scrutiny-a search for the necessity
of promoting a compelling state interest-is required.
The decisions of the Supreme Court, however, are neither so
neatly defined nor so woodenly made. 4 Rather, as Professor Michel-
man first suggested, judicial review of classifications challenged under
the Fourteenth Amendment is more akin to a chemistry than a calcu-
lus. 5 Stated another way, the standard of review applied does not
cago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969), and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), with Weber v.
Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435
(1970); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961), and Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
34. The majority decision in San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodri-
quez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407 (U.S. March 21, 1973), however, uses the language and
framework of traditional equal protection dichotomy. The majority argues that dis-
crimination resulting from existing school finance schemes is justifiable because (1)
the classification does not involve a suspect criterion nor have a heavy impact against
an identifiable group of persons subject to majoritarian abuse and in need of judicial
protection; (2) the classification does not involve a fundamental interest for, as it was
conceded that a minimally adequate education was provided every child, the Court held
that education was not generally a constitutionally protected interest; and (3) the chal-
lenged school finance system was rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in
local control and broad discretion in fiscal affairs. Interestingly, Justice White came
to the opposite conclusion on a purported "rational basis" test.
Justice Marshall's dissent ably describes how the majority's framework and labels
used in its equal protection analysis in Rodriquez only mask what the Court has
actually done in many of the cases cited immediately above. That which is the
"restrained review" of one judge in one opinion is a mutation of "stricter scrutiny" of
another judge in another opinion. It is time that members of the Court begin to apply
the warning in Swann that "substance, not semantics, must govern." Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971). As long as the Justices
try to write within a two pronged equal protection dichotomy, they will be guilty of
hiding substance with semantics, or worse, will be in danger of determining substance
from semantics. Regardless, of the merits of the Rodriquez decision, Justice Marshall's
dissent contains not only greater judicial honesty but also, hopefully, the prod to
more enlightening judicial analysis in the future.
35. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 36 (1969)
(hereinafter cited as Michelman]. See also Comment, 7 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-CiV. Im.
L Rav. 103, 105 (1972); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Foreword: In
May 1973] RIGHT TO EDUCATION
determine the result in any particular case; rather, the interests at stake,
coupled with the facts, are weighed by the Court in a synergistic fash-
ion. It is the purpose of this article to explore these interests and to
present the facts so that the result, regardless of the semantics em-
ployed, is apparent. 6
The Burden of Justification
The inquiry begins with Brown v. Board of Education:
[The] opportunity [of an education] where the state has under-
taken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms.37
The issue here is not just deprivation of "equal educational opportun-
ity" as in Brown on a racial basis,3 8 but deprivation of all educational
opportunity39 on a variety of bases, all falling under the category of
the "uneducability" of the excluded child. Unless the burden of justi-
fying the classification is substantially altered because of the assumed
nonracial nature of total exclusion from school, as compared with
school segregation, "a fortiori [such] conduct . . . is violative of the
[Constitution]. 40  In any event, at a minimum, "the burden of justify-
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Pro-
tection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
36. Compare Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional
Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1971), with Dimond, School Segregation in the North:
There is But One Constitution, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as School Segregation].
37. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
38. That Brown is primarily a racial classification, not an "equal educational
opportunity" case is accepted by the author. See, School Segregation, supra note 36,
at 2-3.
39. Cf. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1954).
The court said in Lee: "[Als long as the State of Alabama maintains a public school
system it cannot make public education 'unavailable' for a class of citizens .... .
Id. at 754. See also Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
40. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972). Mills is
based on the federal government's fifth amendment responsibility not to deny due
process of law. Cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). For purposes of this
discussion, it is sufficient to assume that in the District of Columbia the fifth amend-
ment merely incorporates with respect to the federal government the states' fourteenth
amendment responsibility not to deny to their citizens the equal protection of the laws.
E.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). Indeed, this assumption
may even be in accord with the late Justice Harlan's emerging review of all challenged
classifications under a due process rubric. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 259-66 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917); Michelman, supra note 35, at 16-18.
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ing any school rule or regulation . . . terminating [the right to receive
a public school education] is on the school authorities.
'41
Justifications
In determining what chemistry will lead to the court's ultimate
decision on this issue, consider initially the justifications offered by the
state for denying all educational opportunity to some children. First,
unlike Tinker42 or even Brown, there is no issue of whether the ex-
cluded child will disrupt the regular classroom or whether he can be
segregated from his fellows;4 3 it is assumed, arguendo, that the disrup-
tive, retarded, exceptional, or otherwise handicapped child may be con-
stitutionally separated from his peers and placed in special classes,
special institutions, community programs, and the like. The availabil-
ity of such a "less drastic alternative" to exclusion for serving the
state's legitimate interest in educating all its children renders the pres-
ent practice of exclusion senseless; the state practice of exclusion is
simply not "adequately tailored" to the state's legitimate purpose to
withstand judicial review.44
Second, there is no factual merit to the blanket claim that the
excluded children are in any objective sense uneducable or untrainable.
Rather, it is the state which has decided to give up on the excluded
child and provide no educational program. The state's self-imposed
choice in this regard cannot serve to make the child what he is not;
the educability of every child is a matter of fact to be proven by evi-
dence, not by the very state action being challenged. Since every child
is capable of benefiting from education and training,45 the "classifying
41. Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971). Ordway
involved the partial exclusion of a woman from high school solely by reason of her
pregnancy; the court required that the plaintiff be immediately reinstated in good stand-
ing. See also Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970).
42. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
43. John W. Davis in opening argument for South Carolina in Brown said:
"May it please the Court, I think if appellants' construction of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment . . . should prevail, I am unable to see why a state would have any further
right to segregate its pupils on the ground of sex or on the ground of age or on the
ground of mental capacity." And a very strong case can be made-given the long
history of invidious discrimination to which, for example, the mentally retarded have
been subjected-that the segregation of retarded children into separate residential in-
stitutions, schools, or classes is at least "suspect."
44. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333-34 (1972); Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134, 146 (1972); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1970).
45. "Without exception, expert opinion indicates that: '[A]l mentally re-
tarded persons are capable of benefiting from a program of education and training;
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fact"--the total incapacity of the child excluded-provides no justifica-
tion.
Third, there is no danger of involving the judiciary in the unman-
ageable, nonjusticiable task of providing for differential needs and the
interminable debate about input and output standards for evaluating
what constitutes an equal educational opportunity.46 Whatever the
merit of these justifications for restraining judicial intervention into
school affairs, the extreme case considered here presents no such con-
cern. The children out of school receive nothing; they ask only for
something.
Thus, the only real justifications are only the now familiar cries
of administrative convenience and money.4 7  These justifications have
been explicitly rejected in many cases,48 while arguably being accepted
in a few others,4 9 as adequate to justify a challenged classification." °
that the greatest number of retarded persons, given such education and training, are
capable of achieving self-sufficiency and the remaining few, with such education and
training are capable of achieving some degree of self-care; that the earlier such edu-
cation and training begins, the more thoroughly and the more efficiently a mentally
retarded person will benefit from it and, whether begun early or not, that a mentally
retarded person can benefit at any point in his life and development from a program of
education." Pennsylvania Ass'n of Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp.
279, 295-97 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (footnotes omitted). In the footnotes to this finding,
the court cited the trial testimony of experts in the field, Drs. Goldberg, Gallagher,
Steadman, Blatt, and Mann, and the studies cited in note 20 supra.
46. See, e.g., McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), afj'd sub
nom. mem., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969); Kurland, supra note 2, at 597-98.
The concerns there expressed for judicial restraint, however, relate primarily to revo-
lutionizing school finance structures in order to reallocate dollars among children al-
ready receiving some education. Compare School Segregation, supra note 36, at 19-20,
with Dimond, Serrano: A Victory of Sorts for Ethics, Not Necessarily for Education,
2 YALE REv. OF LAW & SOCIAL ACTION 132, 134-36 and n. 31 & 48, (1972) [herein-
after cited as Serrano]. Unlike the school finance cases, the case of the child excluded
from all education involves a total deprivation and, therefore, does not involve such
complex fiscal, and educational policy issues. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4419-20 (U.S. March 21, 1973). Tax structures are not
at issue and no experts claim that children (especially the handicapped) should go
without the opportunity of education entirely.
47. Assuming that 2 percent of the school age children are excluded from school,
and that their education would cost the state two times the average cost per pupil,
"money" still means less than 5 percent of the school budget. And even that cost
should be offset by the alternative costs and losses incurred from failure to provide
education. See note 21 supra.
48. See, e.g., Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 197 (1971); Graham v. Richard-
son, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969); Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218,
233 (1964).
49. I use the term "arguably" advisedly. First, I am unaware of any cases
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There is no independently rational basis for the exclusion of children
from education.51
Faced with only these frankly pedestrian justifications, not much
should be required to tip the decision against the state imposed exclu-
sion of some children from all publicly supported educational oppor-
tunity.52 Yet quite an array of judicially recognized reasons compel the
total eradication of this particular discrimination.
Suspect Classification
The Court has strictly scrutinized several classifications which are
based upon, or have an impact most heavily on, for example, race,
53
where a pattern of systematic discrimination and total deprivation-as with exclusion
of some children from the schooling available to other children-has been adequately
justified as an understandable product of administrative convenience. E.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.I. 1970);
cf. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
Second, Dandridge v. Williams did not hold that the extra costs, or reallocation of
present monies, required to cure the discrimination there challenged, constitute adequate
justification. While the Court noted the "difficult responsibility of allocating limited
public welfare funds," it upheld the maximum grant welfare plan on the independent,
"non-financial" basis that the state had a "legitimate interest in encouraging employ-
ment and in avoiding discrimination between welfare families and the working poor."
397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970). If any similar, independent rational basis exists for ex-
cluding some children entirely from the opportunity to obtain an education and training,
it escapes me. To the contrary, as noted by the district court in Hosier, "[I]t is
manifestly contrary to the public good in this territory to develop and foster a ghetto
of ignorance, with countless untrained, untutored and perhaps untended children ...
mhe most compelling of public concern militates in favor of the prompt admission
of these [excluded children] to the public schools." 314 F. Supp. at 321 (It should
also be noted that in Dandridge, the Court was not confronted with total deprivation
"for some aid [was] provided to all eligible families and all eligible children." 397
U.S. at 481 (emphasis added).
50. There is no merit in drawing any distinctions between dejure and defacto
classifications. The Court's decisions simply pay little, if any heed to the explicitness
of the discrimination. Compare Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), with James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), with
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); and Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217
(1971), with Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964), and Wright v.
Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). Indeed, the case of exclusion pre-
sents a good example of why such distinction is without substance: children are ex-
cluded by all variety of statutory provisions and equally effective, but not non-statu-
torily sanctioned, practices. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866
(D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
51. Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969).
52. See Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1286 (1st Cir. 1970); Ordway v.
Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (E.D. Mass. 1971).
53. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
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poverty, 54 alienage or ancestry, 55 and religion.58  These "suspect" clas-
sifications have several things in common: they stigmatize certain per-
sons by implying popular or official belief in their inherent inferiority
or undeservingness. Historically they have been used for oppressive
purposes, namely the systematic devaluation of the claims of these per-
sons to nondiscriminatory sharing of the burdens and benefits of social
existence. They often single out these persons by requiring them to
overcome special burdens before enjoying the social goods more freely
made available to all others. 57  Moreover, these classifications involve
classes of persons who constitute "discrete and insular minorities"
58
which historically have been unable to participate fully in the political
process and, therefore, are fit subjects of particular judicial protec-
tion.59
Judged by these standards, the classification here involved is "sus-
pect." First, children excluded from schooling do represent a vulner-
able, discrete and insular minority. As children, they are foreclosed
from all participation in the political process by their very minority:
they lack the franchise. As variously handicapped and labeled chil-
dren, historically, they have been special subjects for state neglect or
lifetime institutionalization, the subjects of social ridicule or social dis-
dain. Moreover, inborn, acquired or school imposed mental, physical
or behavioral handicaps often deprive them of the public and family
54. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Harper v. Virginia State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
55. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimacy);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (aliens); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.
475 (1954) (Mexican); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Japanese);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese).
56. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). It is not my intention to ration-
alize any of these decisions with the results reached in, for example, Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). I only mean to suggest that whatever the Court's
"suspicion" of these classifications, it should be present in full measure with respect to
children excluded from education.
57. See Michelman, supra note 35, at 20 (articulation of the components of an
"invidious" classification). In Rodriquez, the opinion of the Court adopts a similar
approach in defining what constitutes a suspect classification in the negative: "The
system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines [with respect to school fi-
nance] have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process." 41 U.S.L.W. at 4415; cf. case
cited note 58 infra.
58. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
59. Cf. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
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solicitude shown all other children. For the states and many families,
the excluded child is more easily forgotten, excluded, or set aside than
served.
Second, many of these children are classified as "emotionally dis-
turbed," "retarded," and otherwise "unfit," adjudged by school authori-
ties as inherently of inferior mental and emotional capacity, undeserv-
ing of even that education provided and compelled upon other children.
This second classifying act, exclusion, has the effect of adding the
stigma of uneducability to that of any other label already applied to
the child. Not race, poverty, alienage and ancestry, nor religion have
been so clearly used by the state and the majority to stigmatize a class
of persons as unfit to enjoy the benefits usually accorded others. Of-
ten, the very basis for the classification is mental, emotional and phy-
sical inferiority; that classification has been used in an oppressive way
to deny to the excluded children an educational opportunity freely made
available to others.
Third, the classification bears little relationship to the child's abil-
ity to profit from schooling. Although a child classified as retarded
or disturbed may be "less able" to learn anything from a calculus
or physics class than some of his peers, he is just as "able," with school-
ing, to learn some skills, gain some measure of competence, and im-
prove himself some. To the extent therefore that all children are edu-
cable or trainable, their relative learning capcity is basically unrelated
to every child's identical stake in having the opportunity of at least
some education. Where the issue is the legitimacy of total depriva-
tion of educational opportunity, all children share in common a single
attribute, the ability to learn. 60
Finally, excluded children are required to purchase at private
schools any educational opportunity they are to obtain, whereas the
states make education freely available to other children. Thus, this
classification by exclusion from schooling does not bear even the super-
ficial neutrality of the faulty wealth classifications held illegal in the
60. See notes 20 & 45 and accompanying text supra. I am not arguing that
physical, mental or emotional classifications are inherently suspect in every context.
For example, I have already suggested that such criteria may in some instances form
the basis for separating children within or between schools into different groups.
See notes 28-32 & 43 and accompanying text supra. The stigmatizing and limiting
nature of classifications based on such traits, however, must be scrutinized closely
where they are used by the state for purposes and in contexts which both ex-
tend beyond their meaning and impose extraordinary handicaps ill-suited to the cri-
teria.
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criminal process and voting cases. 6 In those cases all persons were
charged a uniform price for the transcript or the right to vote, but
the differential impact on the indigent made a suspect classification.
Here, one class of persons is required to pay for any education while
the states offer an education free to all others. 62 The conjunction of
all these factors requires the Court to treat the classification challenged
as suspect. 62A
Impact on a Fundamental Interest
Although the Supreme Court recently held in Rodriquez,63 in
the context of school finance litigation, that education is not per se
a constitutionally guaranteed right, the debate over the "fundamental-
ity" of education for equal protection analysis for all cases involving
education has yet to be resolved by the Court. Even the slim five
man majority in Rodriquez eschewed holding that education is never
of more significance than, for example, recreational facilities in evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of challenged classifications.6 4  Uniformly,
theretofore, the lower courts had required that states bear a higher bur-
den of justification for classifications which affect education. 5  In
61. See, Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
62. It is the poor, therefore, who are unable to purchase education, who lose all
opportunity to be educated. They are entitled at least to the "minimum protection"
necessary to obtain the opportunity. See Michelman, supra note 35. I think it fair
to add, however, that the deprivation of all education does not depend solely on family
poverty. Professor Michelman no doubt would argue that every child is constitu-
tionally entitled to access to education. See id. at 9-13.
62A. Unlike Rodriquez, the exclusion of children presents (1) a definable
class of persons, (2) "saddled with such disabilities, subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process," and (3) who are effectively and completely excluded from the opportunity of
a publicly supported education. Compare note 57 supra.
63. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 41 U.S.L.W. 4415
(U.S. March 21, 1973).
64. A comparison of Griffin v. Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964),
with Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) and Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435
(1970), suggests that education-at least compared with recreational facilities-may
be an interest treated with more weight by the Court. But see Goldstein, supra
note 3, at n.118. The commentary on whether education is a fundamental interest
has gone both ways. Compare Coons supra note 32, with Goldstein supra note 3.
Education is arguably in some middle ground, below race, speech and voting, but
above social, economic, welfare, and business regulation. See Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 Hv. L. REv. 1065 (1969); Comment, 7 HRv. CIV.
RIGHTS-Crv. Lm. L. REV. 103 (1972).
65. See, e.g., Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Ord-
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Rodriquez, whatever its political implications about the willingness of
the Court to intervene, we have learned again that simple labels do
not fit either complex social institutions nor nine justices. To draw
the conclusion that the impact of a classification on education is never
of special constitutional relevance is to allow the semantics and form
of Rodriquez to govern the substance of constitutional adjudication
hereafter. 6 Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the Court's prior en-
comia to education, saluted again by the Rodriquez majority, are now
to be treated as only ancient rhetoric. After all, the Court in Brown
did state:
Today education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and
the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recog-
nition of the importance of education to our democratic society.
It is required in the performance of our most basic public re-
sponsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foun-
dation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the op-
portunity of an education.
67
The Rodriquez majority did not reject that judgment; it merely
held that the relationship between differences in education and differ-
ences in taxable wealth, property taxes and expenditures among dis-
tricts were not dramatic enough to justify judicial intervention of uncer-
tain impact into the financing structures which now support educa-
tion in every state of the Union except Hawaii. The issue of the fun-
damentality of education in other cases still must be assessed by the
particular facts presented in each case.68
way v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (D. Mass. 1971); Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp.
316, 319 (D.V.I. 1970); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507 (D.D.C. 1967);
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
66. See note 34 supra.
67. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added). Cf. Dixon v. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961). "It requires no argument to dem-
onstrate that education is vital and, indeed, basic to civilized society. Without suffi-
cient education the plaintiffs would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to
enjoy life to the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and responsi-
bilities of good citizens." The last four presidents have mouthed similar paeans to the
importance of education to the development of every child and the nation. U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2830 (1969) (Nixon); U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4648-49
(1968) (Johnson); U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1450 (1963) (Kennedy); U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5412 (1958) (Eisenhower).
68. Rodriquez did not face the issue of the fundamentality of education in the
context of a total denial, and the majority so indicated explicitly: "Even if it were
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After pouring billions into the enterprise and compelling chil-
dren's attendance upon an education for one-sixth of their lives, states
are virtually estopped from denying that education not only undergirds
the individual's chance for economic and social independence, but also
enhances his ability to exercise all other basic constitutional rights. As
the Court has previously noted, education is "an indispensable ingred-
ient for achieving the kind of nation, and the kind of citizenry"0' 9 neces-
sary to a free society. "Our public educational system is the genius
of our democracy. ' 70  Even discounting for judicial hyperbole, it is
fair to argue that such factors do show the unique importance of edu-
cation, at least in cases involving total deprivation-as compared with
food, shelter, clothing, recreation, police protection, and sewers.7 '
Education always has been an aspect of, and in tension with, the
First Amendment freedoms. It is in large part an intellectual and
political activity whose impact affects the exercise of all other rights;
it is for this reason that education is vital to the maintenance of demo-
cratic institutions72 and has long been the subject of special judicial
protection. That education is political, a method of passing our culture
and "way of life" from one generation to the next, is obvious; indeed,
it is this very political aspect of schooling with its compulsory over-
conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right [the right to vote and to receive
First Amendment freedoms], we have no indication that the present levels of educa-
tional expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit
appellees' argument might have if a State financing system occasioned an absolute de-
nial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no
basis for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differ-
ences in spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the present case-no
charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with an oppor-
tunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyments of the rights of
speech and of full participation in the political process." 41 U.S.L.W. at 4418.
69. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968).
70. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 628 (1967) (Clark, J., dis-
senting).
71. In the context of the school finance cases, some have argued that the dis-
cussion of the fundamentality of education is more the result of some need to remind
schoolmen and children of the importance of their tasks than of some measurable im-
pact of schooling and dollars for education on the fate of the children in adult life.
See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 3, at 534-36, 538; Brest, Book Review, 23 STAN. L. REV.
591 (1971). See also Serrano, supra note 46, at 132, 137 & n.48. Whatever the
merit of these arguments in the context of cases involving gross revenue raising and
spending differentials, the "fundamentality" in exclusion cases is directly related to the
classification: exclusion of the handicapped from education is directly related to loss
of income, independence, self respect, and even years of life. E.g., Kirk, Research in
Education, in MENTAL RETARDATION 63-67 (Stevens & Heber 1964).
72. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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tones73 which has so often been in tension with the rights to know,
74
express, 75 and freely exercise religious belief.76  Thus, education in
some cases surely may be of special constitutional relevance: the child's
mind, especially as shaped by the school, is of more constitutional sig-
nificance than his stomach. This is especially true where the issue is
whether the child's mind will be affected by any schooling at all.
In the case of exclusion from educational opportunity, we deal with
a system of public education which does deny to some children all
opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary to citizenship,
and even freedom from later state institutionalization: therefore we
deal with state regulation directly affecting freedoms guaranteed by
the Constitution.77
The Balance of Public and Private Interests
Included in the chemistry of any decision is consideration of the
"interests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification. ' '78 The
question is "whether all those excluded are in fact substantially less
interested or affected than those included."79 At a minimum, it is now
clear that excluded children regardless of handicap share in common
with all other children some capacity for development and gaining skill
from education and training. 0 As noted, any distinction premised on
73. Cf. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
74. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 265 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
75. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist.,
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
76. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971). See also School Segregation, supra note 36, at 55.
77. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970). Once again in the
case of exclusion-unlike disparities in allocating school resources or differential abil-
ity to raise dollars to support education-there is a direct relationship between the
challenged classification and the freedoms affected. Recognition of this difference
supports the argument that the "fundamentality" of education may well vary with the
other circumstances presented by the particular case. At a minimum, exclusion from
all education shares fully in whatever the Court may conclude is of special significance
about education in any case.
78. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209-12 (1970); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30
(1968).
79. Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 209 (1970); see Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
80. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp.
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the ineducability and untrainability of excluded children fails upon ex-
amination of the facts. Indeed, for many excluded children who do
suffer real as opposed to school-imagined handicaps, publicly sup-
ported education is even more important than for the normal child;
development and learning are unlikely to come to the handicapped
child without education. For every Bobby Fischer or Thomas A. Edi-
son who thrives without school, there are countless handicapped chil-
dren whose exclusion from education seals a lifetime fate of depend-
ence, eventual institutionalization, loss of liberty or worse. Such result
is contrary to express state policies of developing all citizens for free, inde-
pendent and self-supporting participation in the burdens and benefits
of life in the Republic.81 The state's legitimate purpose is education
of children. Hence, in the circumstances set forth above, the exclusion
of children from that opportunity is not rationally related to the state's
own expressed, legitimate interests; nor does it counterbalance the
interests of those children. 2
Against this background, the judgment of the courts should be
uniform and is predictable:
[Quite apart from the individual child's interest in education, the
state's own] interest in educating the excluded children clearly
must outweigh its interest in preserving financial resources. If
sufficient funds are not available to finance all of these services
and programs that are needed and desirable in the system, then
available funds must be expended equitably in such manner that
no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education.
• . . The inadequacies of [a state's system of public schooling],
whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative in-
efficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on
the "exceptional" or handicapped child than on the normal child.
83
1257, 1259 (E.D. Pa. 1971), 343 F. Supp. 279, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1972); see notes 20,
45, 61 and accompanying text supra.
81. See note 21 supra.
82. Any proffered justification that children are excluded so that resources for
the education of regular children may be maximized should be summarily dismissed.
First, for every excluded child, a counterpart in all material respects may be found who
receives a publicly supported education; and second, no such interest is expressed in the
policy of any state's system of education of which I am aware. Such an asserted
justification, therefore, does not represent a "real state interest [but rather an]
advocate invention for purposes of litigation." School Segregation, supra note 36,
at 6 n.22.
83. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 867 (D.D.C. 1972). See also
Hosier v. Evans, 314 F. Supp. 316 (D.V.1. 1970) (exclusion of alien from schooling);
Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D. Mass. 1971) (exclusion of pregnant
girl).
For those who prefer the structural framework of the "New Equal Protection,"
the same result is reached. For if the court views the classification of some children
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In the years to come, therefore, I believe that the Constitu-
tion, as interpreted and enforced by the courts, will be held to prevent
the states from denying to some children all publicly supported educa-
tional opportunity. It should be unconstitutional for school authori-
ties to wholly banish from education a class of children s.8  At a mini-
mum, the door to schooling will be held ajar, upon default by school
authorities, by judicial intervention to protect the constitutional right
of every child to some education.85 Where the state chooses to provide
as handicapped and excluded from all public schooling as suspect (see notes 53-58 and
accompanying text supra) or as affecting a fundamental interest (see notes 63-77 and
accompanying text supra), closer scrutiny is appropriate: the state must show that the
classification is necessary to promote a compelling interest. Cf. Michelman, supra
note 35, at 20 n.4. The state will not be able to meet this burden (see notes 38-47,
66-70 and accompanying text supra). Indeed, if the court accepts the argument in the
text above (see notes 43-82 and accompanying text supra), the state may be unable to
show that such classification is even reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose.
The classification, therefore, should be struck down under this analysis as well.
84. And that is a long way to come from Justice Holmes' remarks approving
sterilization in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927): "Three generations of imbe-
ciles is enough." That is, however, no further than Brown came from Plessy v. Fer-
guson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) and Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393
(1856). See Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobe-
loff, J. concurring).
85. In many states the substantive right to some educational opportunity, or an
education suited to the child's needs, is explicitly guaranteed by state constitutional
and statutory provisions. See, e.g., UTA CONST. art. X, § 1; cf. UTAH CODE ANN.,
§ 53-4-7 (Supp. 1967); NEw MFacO CONST., art. XII, § 1. With the recognition of
the problem, legislatures, under pressure from pending suits, are responding by adopting
legislation providing for the right to some education. E.g., 17 LA. Rav. STAT. § 1942
(1972); Massachusetts Special Education Act of 1972, ch. 766, H.B. 6164. In these
states the federal constitutional analysis is mere surplusage, for the state law provides
an adequate basis for relief and will be enforced. See, e.g., Wolf v. Legislature of the
State of Utah, Civil No. 182646 (3d Dist. Ct., Salt Lake Co., Utah, filed Jan. 1969)
(CLASsiCATrON MATERiALS, supra note 15, at 171); Doe v. Board of School Directors
(Milwaukee Co. Cir. Ct., filed April 13, 1970) (CLASsIFICATION MATERIALS, supra
note 15, at 182). Moreover, diverse state laws which apparently provide for the ex-
clusion of children from school can, and should be, read to apply only to reassignment
from a particular school or classroom into an alternative educational program, not
exclusion from all public education. See Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v.
Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Similarly, state law provisions re-
lieving parents of the compulsory obligation to send certain handicapped children to
school should not relieve school authorities of their obligations under state law to
continue to make the opportunity of education available to the child. See id.
This panoply of possible state law bases for securing the right to some education
should make the state court forum attractive to litigants. However, it also raises the
prospect of abstention by the federal courts upon application by defendants if the state
law is uncertain, pending resolution by state courts. See Reid v. New York, 453 F.2d
238 (2d Cir. 1971); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,
supra. Yet the case for immediate relief is so compelling that the propriety of absten-
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its children an education, that opportunity may not be entirely with-
held from any child.86 The issue remains whether the education of-
fered each child must be minimally adequate.
8
T
Procedural Due Process: The More Justiciable
Way to Guarantee a Minimally Adequate
Education for Every Child
Assuming that the Supreme Court concludes that the door to pub-
lic schooling must remain open to all if open to any, a variation of
the ever-lurking McInnis-Kurland justiciability issue"s is waiting at the
doorstep: how is a court ever to determine what educational program
is appropriate for each child's varying needs? 9 For those more wor-
ried about the fate of the children, the question may be stated another
way: what good will it really do the formerly excluded retardate-
tion will vary with the particular circumstances present in each case. See, e.g.,
Lebanks v. Spears, Civil No. 71-2897 (E.D. La. 1973); Mills v. Board of Educ.,
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Com-
monwealth, supra at 298-300. See also H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 858-90 (1953). In particular, where state law is clear,
exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state law claims, not abstention, is appropriate.
Cf. Askew v. Hargraves, 401 U.S. 476 (1971); UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
In any event, even if the federal court abstains, it should retain jurisdiction to hear
plaintiffs' federal claims on demand of plaintiffs. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241,
244, n.4 (1967); England v. Louisiana State Bd., 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964).
86. To enforce this right to some education, a court may simply enjoin the ex-
clusion of any child from the regular school and classroom unless adequate alternative
facilities and programs are provided. See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp.
866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). See notes 112-27 and accompanying text infra.
87. In the next two sections this issue is addressed in detail. It should be
noted, however, that "exclusion" may be only one variety of deprivation of all educa-
tional opportunity. Proof may show that children incarcerated in various institu-
tions-juvenile homes, reform schools, hospitals or residential institutions for the
handicapped-also fail to receive any education. Cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). Similar showings could be made with respect to certain regular
schools, perhaps on behalf of a severely retarded child placed in an advanced class or a
wholly non-English speaking child in a typical American schoolhouse. Although prov-
ing such denials might be difficult, such effective exclusion should be prohibited by the
constitutional right to some education posited above.
88. See McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Kurland, supra
note 2.
89. In the next section, it will be shown how this concern over justiciability-
first made in the context of allocating dollars between school districts on the basis of
different aggregate needs of the children within each school district-loses much of its
force when considering individual educational plans for individual children's varying
needs. In this section there is discussed only a way for the courts to avoid the issue
entirely by imposing strict procedural safeguards for placement of children in special
classes, thereby removing the courts entirely from the substantive decisions.
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thirteen years old, 5 Y feet tall, 150 pounds-or his new classmates,
to be placed in a regular second grade classroom? The most obvious
answer to the latter question is that there is no established evidence
that such placement will harm any of the children; with a subtle re-
structuring of the class, such placement might benefit all the children
by permitting the regular children to learn by teaching their slower
peer. The equally obvious rejoinder to that answer is that most teach-
ers and most regular students are not tolerant, creative, or humane
enough to attempt, let alone succeed, at such an endeavor.
The unreceptive classroom argument reflects the fundamental
problem which this article is addressing. 0 Teachers, administrators,
school boards, unions, parents and students are now so paranoid about
dealing with diversity-in age, intelligence, ability, character, and cul-
ture-in the same classroom that the far greater danger is that the
normal child will be labeled "slow" and placed in a "special" class.91
Upon opening the school door, then, the greater problem of differential
education suited to the child's needs is not too "high" a placement
for the child's achievement or ability, but too "low." The primary dan-
ger is too much special education (in the sense of wholly separate
classes and groupings), not too little; too many children labeled re-
tarded, for example, not too few.9"
The effective remedy for this problem, therefore, does not rest
with courts affirmatively requiring the schools to provide more special
education as a matter of substantive right under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rather, the minimally acceptable remedy to be imposed
90. The reader, however, should be wary of making this problem what it is not.
See also Kurland, supra note 2, at 590. See also Michelman, supra note 35, at
9-13; School Segregation, supra note 36, at 13-20; Serrano, supra note 46, at 135-36.
91. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
92. As an example, the school categories of educable mentally retarded and
trainable mentally retarded "are not genuine analytic categories, but merely bookkeep-
ing devices designed to conform to bell-shaped curves of I.Q. tests and state and federal
statutory requirements." Kirp, Book Review, 8 INEQuALrrY IN EDUCATION 44 (1971).
Many school systems, pursuant to state statutes (but contrary to federally approved
practices), regularly place children with I.Q. above 70, but below 79 or 75, in EMR
classes, contrary to any accepted practice. See note 16, supra. Indeed, the very no-
tion of what constitutes regular versus special education, especially at the high school
level, is rather arbitrary. See High School Tracking, 12 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 28
(1972). In this article, "regular" refers to any school program which normally leads
to the realistic option of college. This particular definition is chosen because it is one
of the few inputs related to post high school status and it is now viewed as the normal
curriculum. Thus, the common systems of tracking in elementary and secondary edu-
cation will also be subject to the procedures and resulting scrutiny. See notes 99-109
and accompanying text infra.
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by judicial action is a fair procedure for assigning children to various
educational programs. 3  Thus, courts need never determine what edu-
cation is appropriate for any child; they need only determine the mini-
mally required procedures by which school authorites make such deci-
sions. 9sA The issues to be discussed in this section, then, are (1)
whether, under the Constitution, process is due children in their school
placements; and (2) if so, given the circumstances of school classifica-
tions, of what must the "hearing" consist to accord due process of
law?94
Governmental Imposition of Stigma
In Wisconsin v. Constantineau,95 the Supreme Court considered
the need for procedural fairness in any state action which arguably af-
fixes a stigma, or badge of disgrace, on an individual. The police, with-
out notice or prior hearing, had posted a notice in all retail liquor estab-
lishments forbidding sales of liquor to Constantineau because of "ex-
cessive drinking." The Court held that such action failed to accord
the procedural fairness due under the Constitution. Speaking for the
Court, Mr. Justice Douglas stated:
The only issue present here is whether the label or characteriza-
tion given a person by "posting", though a mark of illness to
some, is to others such a stigma or badge of disgrace that pro-
cedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard. . . . We agree with the district court that the private in-
terest is such that those requirements. . .must be met.
It is significant that most of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights are procedural, for it is procedure that marks much of the
difference between rule by law and rule by fiat.
Only when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of
an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive results be
prevented.9 6
93. Such a procedure presumably also could solve the occasional problem of too
"high" a placement as well if a hearing on such placement were triggered by parental
demand, as well as the usual demand by teachers.
93A. The fair procedures, discussed hereafter under a due process rubric may also
be ordered as the means by which an equity court can enforce the right to some edu-
cation. As such, the fair procedures would merely be one type of auxiliary relief
available to an equity court both to root out the affects of prior unconstitutional prac-
tices and prevent their occurrence in the future.
94. For discussion of the procedural rights in the "disciplinary" context, see
Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Buss]; Butler, The Public High School Student's Constitutional
Right to a Hearing, 5 CLEAPINGHOUSE REv. 431 (1971).
95. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
96. Id. at 436 (emphasis added).
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Classifying a child as retarded, emotionally disturbed, slow, dumb,
bad, 7 "excluded," "uneducable," "untrainable," or any of the other
labels applied to children denied education or placed in special classes,
constitutes at least as great a "stigma" or "badge of disgrace" as being
posted a drunk.9" If anything, the public significance of the school
environment and the impressionability of school children-as com-
pared with the liquor store and its patrons-make it greater. Such
drastic action imposes on the child a stigma which may last a lifetime
on his record.99 The child excluded from school or placed in special
classes or institutions "is told . . . that he is unfit to be where society
has determined all acceptable citizens of his age should be."' 00 That
such judgments have so often proven incorrect' 01 increases the child's
personal stake in fair procedures throughout the entire school classifi-
cation process. Thus, even if the only issue present is the school's
pinning an unfavorable label on the child, the Fourteenth Amendment
should command that a full measure of fair procedure is required.1"'
Governmental Imposition of Restraint on Essential Interest
The Supreme Court has also consistently held that where a per-
son's essential interests are at stake, final government action must await
97. In Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), one of the
students was excluded from schooling because of a "behavior problem." He was
called "dumb" by his teachers and "fat lips" by his classmates. Neither label struck a
responsive chord in the child, except as a trigger for withdrawal and minor aggression.
A stigma has an effect in the bearer's mind as well as in the minds of others. This is a
typical example of how school classification can rarely be viewed as simple "discipline"
actions. In Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), the court gave
lip service to the need for procedural fairness, but refused to disturb the school au-
thorities' unbridled prerogative to transfer a student to a special discipline school.
See Buss, supra note 95, at 580-82.
98. For a discussion of the stigma our society has historically placed on the re-
tarded see Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp.
279, 293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1972); cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Professor Kirp
deals at length with the issue of how various school classifications are stigmatizing in
his forthcoming article, "Schools as Sorters."
99. Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1392-93 (E.D. Mich.
1969). The student's record may be available to post secondary education institutions,
employers, and even the sedulous reporter.
100. Buss, supra note 94, at 577.
101. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
102. Such has been the express holding in various contexts, both for exclusion
from schooling and placement in other than regular classes. E.g., Mills v. Board of
Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Marlega v. Board of
School Directors, C.A. No. 70-C-8 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Stewart v. Phillips, C.A. No.
70-1199-F (D. Mass. 1971), CLASSIFICATON MATERIALS, supra note 15, at 233-91;
Vought v. Van Buren, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1392-93 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
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opportunity for a hearing. Where an important public good is denied
or where a significant burden imposed on "life, liberty, or property"
by "state action," process is due. 103  The alternative is to consign those
interests to "the play and action of a purely personal and arbitrary
power."'1 4  From the previous discussion of the importance of educa-
tion for the individual and society, it should be clear that public educa-
tion constitutes such a weighty interest and benefit, at least for pur-
poses of requiring some continuing procedural fairness in the decisions
which might lead to its termination or significant limitation. 105 Unfor-
tunately, the interests of too many children have been subject to proce-
dures so arbitrary as to betray both the express interests of the state
and the merit of the individual child in countless instances. 106 In re-
cent years, lower courts have consistently concluded that the guarantee
of due process of law applies to expulsion, exclusion, or long-term sus-
103. Thus, in the following circumstances, inter alia, due process has been held to
require notice and a hearing before essential interests are disturbed by government
action: Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnish-
ment); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (deprivation of parental rights);
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (right to take bar examina-
tion); Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (dismissal from em-
ployment); Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926)
(accountant's qualifications to practice before the Board of Tax Appeals). Recently
in Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance benefits), the im-
portance of a full hearing prior to termination of a benefit granted by the state was
reaffirmed; hence, if there ever was a doubt, there is no merit to the "right-privilege"
distinction in the context of fair procedure.
104. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
105. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra. Consider also: "It goes
without saying, and needs no elaboration, that a record of expulsion from high school
constitutes a lifetime stigma. It would seem that in taking an action of such drastic
nature the Board of Education would have been interested in providing plaintiff with
the opportunity to offer his explanation of the circumstances prior to the actual ex-
pulsion action by the Board." Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388,
1393 (E.D. Mich., 1969). "I find that to deny a 16 year old eleventh-grade male and
a 17 year old twelfth-grade male access to a public high school in Wisconsin is to in-
flict upon each of them irreparable injury for which no remedy at law is adequate.
I make this finding by taking judicial notice of the social, economic, and psychologi-
cal value and importance today of receiving a public education through twelfth grade."
Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702, 704 (E.D. Wis.), af 'd, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). It would seem beyond argument that the
right to receive a public school education is a basic personal right or liberty. Ordway v.
Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971). "I take notice that in the pres-
ent day, suspension for a period of time substantial enough to prevent one from ob-
taining academic credit for a particular term may well be, and often is in fact, a more
severe sanction than a monetary fine or confinement imposed by a court in a criminal
proceeding." Soglin v. Kaufman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
106. For a discussion of the total miseducation of children see notes 1-21 and
note 84 and accompanying text supra.
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pension from schooling'0 7 and placement in special or other than regu-
lar classes.108
The Context and Balance of Interests in School Classification:
A Minimally Adequate Education for Every Child
In view of these two distinct, yet cumulative bases for according
due process of law to school classifications, the unresolved issue is not
whether due process of law applies, 109 but what procedures that elusive
concept requires in the name of fundamental fairness. The answer
depends on the particular context and the balance of the interests be-
tween the school and the child. 10
The primary interests of the school and each child are identical:
securing an adequate education, avoiding unnecessary stigmatization,
insuring that any necessary stigmatization is both accurate and justly
affixed, and providing some educational benefit appropriate to the clas-
sification. The interests of both diverge in practice in many respects,
however. Teachers recommend troublesome or different children for
placement in special classes or other special treatment regardless of
benefit to the child. Schools, and their psychologists, test children for
their school preparedness and "intelligence" and place them in various
tracks or none at all, as much for the asserted benefit of the other
107. E.g., Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971);
Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970); Wasson v. Trowbridge,
382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150
(5th Cir. 1961); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Givens v.
Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202 (W.D.N.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Sullivan v. Houston Independent
School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools,
306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969); Knight v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 115
(E.D.N.Y. 1969).
108. See Lebanks v. Spears, Civ. No. 71-2897 (E.D. La. 1973); Mills v.
Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Stewart
v. Phillips, C.A. No. 70-1199-F (D. Mass. 1971); CLASSIFICATION MATERIALS,
supra note 15, at 233-91; cf. Walton v. Board of Educ., Civil No. 18209/71 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County, filed Feb. 4, 1972) (reinstating an excluded student to regular classes
and holding that the failure to hold a hearing and provide a student full-time instruc-
tion violated New York State Education Law).
109. In the context of sanctions for misconduct in school, Professor Buss has al-
ready made the point that "[a]ny substantial impairment of this interest [the student's
interest in obtaining an education] should result only after utilization of procedures
satisfying the requirements of due process of law." Buss, supra, note 94, at 550.
110. Cf. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 426 (1969); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Joint Anti-Facist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also
Buss, supra note 94, at 573-77.
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children in school as the child specially placed. These school interests
are inimical to the interest of the child classified as exceptional in any
respect.
The child's interests, if he is to be the potential subject of the
exceptional label and placement in other than regular class, are a fair
and accurate diagnosis. He should be matched to a program which
will actually benefit him, and placed as close to the regular curriculum
and classmates as possible. There should be periodic review and
evaluation of both the child's progress and the value of the educational
program to which he is assigned. The school's secondary interests
are in conflict with those of the child: preservation of a regular school
population conveniently taught by the classroom teacher, maintenance
of the prerogatives of schoolmen over the educational decisions which
affect children's lives, avoidance of evaluation procedures which take
time, are costly, and subject school programs to scrutiny. Given this
divergence of interests, there is sufficient cause for adversity, as well
as evidence of danger of misclassification by school authorities, 1 ' to
require a broad panoply of procedural rights in the school classification
process.
The issues to be resolved in hearings on educational placements,
as compared to meting out discipline, are sufficiently different to re-
quire different procedural safeguards." 2  In the case of discipline, the
primary issues relate to whether the accused student is guilty of the
offense charged and what penalty is appropritate. In the case of edu-
cational classifications, the issues are much more complex and con-
tinuing in nature. What is "wrong" with the child? What does the
child need? Will he receive adequate education in a regular classroom,
with special support? What available educational program will benefit
the child? Must a new curriculum or support service be developed?
After placement for a period of time, has a particular special educa-
tion program actually benefited the child? If not, what alteration
should be made in the program or placement of the child? If the child
has benefited, when can he return to the regular class? If the child
can benefit as much from regular class, are there overriding educa-
tional interests which make some other placement appropriate? When
and how can the child be returned to the mainstream of education?
111. See notes 4-21 and accompanying text supra.
112. See Buss, supra note 94, at 589-639 for an excellent discussion of the pro-
cedures required in discipline cases. See also Lines, The Case Against Short Suspen-
sions, 12 INEQUALITY IN EDUCATION 39 (1972).
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In view of the type of issues to be decided, considerable assistance
to the student, an impartial and informed tribunal, and continuing re-
view of program as well as child are essential if the school classifica-
tion process is to be made fundamentally fair.113 The minimally fair
procedures for school classifications, therefore, must be closely tailored
to the primary interest in adequate education of both the school and
the student if the child is to be safeguarded from arbitrary abuse.
These procedures must accommodate the continuing nature of the per-
sonal and school interests at stake.
The Procedures Required to Guarantee
Due Process of Law
In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Common-
wealth"4 and Mills v. Board of Education1 5 district courts have been
forced to confront the issue of what procedures are necessary for insur-
ing that children are treated fairly in school. These courts have faced
the extreme case: how to fit a child into an education program when
he has already been wrongfully" 6 excluded, and consequently harmed,
in the face of present classification practices which assign children to
special classes both arbitrarily 17 and too often erroneously.118  With
113. The dichotomy between discipline and educational classifications often dis-
appears upon analysis of the facts of each particular special placement or disciplinary
action. Upon investigation, each may reveal a situation involving a child with inher-
ent or school-acquired handicaps, a history of misclassification and mistreatment by
the school or family, and a total failure by all to deal adequately with the child's needs.
Therefore, the "simple" discipline case should be closely analyzed to insure that it is
nothing more. This deeper inspection becomes even more critical when fair proced-
ures are imposed on school classifications; otherwise, it is too easy for school au-
thorities to change the "retarded problem" into the "discipline problem," thereby
continuing past malpractices and avoiding the very process which can insure adequate
education for the child. See note 97 supra.
114. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
115. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
116. The exclusions are "wrongful" because of the failure both to provide some
education and an adequate hearing prior to exclusion. Such wrongful exclusion, stand-
ing alone, requires compensatory relief. Knight v. Board of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 115
(E.D.N.Y. 1970). Such relief might be in the form of the opportunity to attend
school during the summer or after majority.
117. Present classification practices are marked by the following: unquestioning
reliance on teacher recommendations for evaluation of the child (as opposed to evalua-
tion of the teacher and other children); reliance on single measure tests of I.Q. ad-
ministered by school psychologists incompetent to provide the full evaluation of the
child necessary even to identify his needs; failure to evaluate the suitability of special
programs and the child's progress therein; and failure to consider the child's changing
needs. One of the most arbitrary features is the lack of any ascertainable standards for
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the aid of the parties, these two courts spelled out constitutionally ac-
ceptable procedures for prior evaluation, periodic review after place-
ment and ascertainable standards for the entire process. Each court
determined that no child shall be labelled handicapped, recommended
for special class, excluded from a regular class or subjected to other
significant change in education status without a "constitutionally ade-
quate prior hearing and periodic review of the child's status, progress,
and the adequacy of any educational alternatives." 119  The parameters
of these procedures are:
1. Timely evaluation and placement upon identification of
any child denied all education;
2. Public notification by the media, and personal notice to
known children effected, of the newly enforceable rights to some
education and hearing to determine appropriate educational pro-
grams;
3. A full evaluation of the child's needs by competent ex-
perts and development of a specific plan-including (a) specific
diagnostic results, (b) a specific prescription for meeting diag-
nosed needs, (c) and specific goals and benchmarks over time to
assist in measuring the success or failure of the prescription and
accuracy of diagnosis-prior to placement, or recommendation of
placement, in other than a regular class.
identifying the needs of children and matching them to programs. Cf. Holmes v.
New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968): "It hardly
need be said that the existence of an absolute and uncontrolled discretion in an agency
of government vested with the administration of a vast program, such as public hous-
ing, would be an intolerable invitation to abuse. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605,
609-10 (5th Cir. 1964). For this reason alone due process requires that selections
among applicants be made in accordance with 'ascertainable standards,' and, in cases
where many candidates are equally qualified under these standards, that further selec-
tions be made in some reasonable manner such as 'by lot or on the bases of the
chronological order of application.'" Id. at 612; Hornsby v. Allen, 330 F.2d 55, 56
(5th Cir. 1964) (on petition for rehearing). Among the due process deficiencies cited
in Holmes were failure to make available to prospective tenants the regulations on
admissions, failure to process applications chronologically or in accordance with ascer-
tainable standards, automatic expiration of all applications within two years, failure to
accord credit for past time on waiting lists to renewals of applications, no public wait-
ing list by which an applicant could guage the progress of his case or his status, and
failure to inform applicants of determinations of ineligibility. Almost all of these de-
ficiencies are characteristic of the administration of all too many special education
programs.
118. See notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra.
119. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). See also Penn-
sylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972). A similar procedure has been adopted by the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts by legislation (Mass. H.B. 6184), effective 1973-74 school year, and accepted by
the parties and approved by the court pursuant to a preliminary consent agreement in
Lebanks v. Spears, Civil No. 71-2897 (E.D. La. 1973).
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4. Submission of the proposed placement, and reasons
therefor, to the family with notice of opportunity for hearing be-
fore placement by a hearing officer and availability of assistance
necessary in evaluating the proposal and preparing for a hear-
ing;12
0
5. Expungement, and clarification of any statements by the
family, of records made in the course of prior determinations in
the absence of fair procedures;
6. At the hearing, the burden of proof on school authorities
as to all facts and as to the appropriateness of placement in other
than a regular class-all in the context of a presumption that
placement in a regular public school class, with appropriate an-
cillary services, if necessary, is preferable to any other place-
ment;1
21
7. The hearing promptly held, upon request of the fam-
ily, at a time and place reasonably convenient to the family;
8. The right to a representative of the student's choice,
including legal counsel;
9. The hearing, open or closed, at the discretion of the parent
or guardian;
10. The hearing recorded;
11. The hearing officer independent of the local school sys-
tem;1
22
12. Prior to hearing, access to all public school system
120. Both Pennsylvaia Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth and
Mills v. Board of Education make it clear that the notice must actually inform the
family of all their rights and the proposed placement and reasons therefore. Educa-
tional jargon must be made understandable to the family. In Mills, for example, the
court ordered that "such notice shall: (a) describe the proposed action in detail;
(b) clearly state the specific and complete reasons for the proposed action, including
the specification of any tests or reports upon which such action is proposed; (c) de-
scribe any alternative educational opportunities available on a permanent or temporary
basis; (d) inform the parent or guardian of the right to object to the proposed action
at a hearing before the Hearing Officer; (e) inform the parent or guardian that the
child is eligible to receive, at no charge, the services of a federally or locally funded
diagnostic center for an independent medical, psychological and educational evaluation
and shall specify the name, address and telephone number of an appropriate local di-
agnostic center; (f) inform the parent or guardian of the right to be represented at
the hearing by legal counsel; to examine the child's school records before the hearing
(any tests or reports upon which the proposed action may be based, to present evi-
dence, including expert medical, psychological and educational testimony); and, to
confront and cross-examine any school official, employee, or agent of the school dis-
trict or public department who may have evidence upon which the proposed action
was based." 348 F. Supp. at 880-81.
121. Ordway v. Hargraves, 323 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (D. Mass. 1971):
"'Tlhe burden of justifying any school rule or regulation limiting [the right to receive
a public school education] is on the school authorities."
122. In Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children, the hearing officer was a desig-
nee of the State Secretary of Education; in Mills, he was a nonschool employee of the
District of Columbia.
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records pertaining to the child, including any tests or reports upon
which the proposed action may be based;
13. The opportunity to cross-examine any witness testifying
for school authorities;
14. The opportunity to present evidence (including an al-
ternative evaluation, proposed placement, and other expert testi-
mony) and to compel the attendance of school officials or their
agents who may have relevant evidence;
15. The hearing officer's determination in writing, stating
the reasons therefor by specific findings of fact and conclusions of
law;
16. Pending resolution by hearing, the child's educational
status not to be changed unless the parents consent;
17. Not less than every two years, the placement of a child in
other than a regular class reviewed as set forth above and appro-
priate modifications made in the child's specific plan.
123
That, in substance, constitutes the procedural guarantees promulgated
by two courts to insure that every child will be treated fairly in the
school classification process.1
24
The Procedural Road to Adequate Education
These specific procedures are suggested with the hope that they
could guarantee every child a minimally adequate education within the
context of services available to all children in any state.' 25 At this
point in time, the issue of whether such fair procedure will insure ade-
quate education remains, frankly, untested. We do not know whether
families will respond to procedural guarantees by exercising their
123. In Mills, similar procedures were required for disciplinary actions denying
access to regular instruction for more than two days. In Pennsylvania Association for
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, at least for the initial period of implementation,
two masters were appointed by the court to assist in overseeing the implementation
of the process. In Lebanks v. Spears, Civ. No. 2897 (E.D. La. 1973), by consent
decree and order a modification of all these procedures was made to fit the local
situation.
124. Mills and Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children, however, may
place too much reliance (and burden) on the family. First, it is unclear that the in-
terests of parent and child in the school classification process are as one; the child's
interest may not only be different, but also independent. Second, parental demand for
hearings may be an ineffective way to secure the fair evaluation and placement re-
quired. It may well be, therefore, that (1) prior hearings, like periodic review, should
be mandatory and cannot be waived by the parent or child; (2) the child's interests
should be represented separately from the parent's, and (3) continuing court ap-
pointed "visitation committee" is necessary to oversee and evaluate the content of
programs and adequacy of the school classification process.
125. In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children, the state, as well as
local school authorities, are given responsibility for both enforcing the court orders and
providing a constitutionally adequate system of education.
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rights, especially in conjunction with existing community and consumer
groups (of whom the various associations for exceptional children are
merely the most obvious) to challenge programs as well as placements.
We do not know whether school, health, and welfare officials will re-
spond creatively with new support services for children in regular
classes, special classes, and community programs, which actually bene-
fit children and prepare them for full participation in life as adults
and responsible citizens. We do not know whether the scrupulous pro-
cedures will focus attention on the present inadequacy of many aspects
of schooling. In summary, we cannot know for certain whether fair
procedure will mean an improvement in every child's education.
We can be reasonably sure, however, that such procedures, operat-
ing in conjunction with the right to some education, will serve as a
prophylactic against the worst education malpractices. No child will
be excluded entirely from education; no child will be placed in an insti-
tution or special class and thereafter forgotten or given no education;
attention will be turned to providing educational benefit, as well as
meting out stigma justly; and every child will be guaranteed the oppor-
tunity to challenge before an independent tribunal not only the ar-
bitrary school practices, but the adequacy of his education program.
As schooling is so much process, the judicial imposition of fair proce-
dures fits the task. We can be sure that we are, at least in part, ad-
dressing the right problem.
There are few substantive rules about what does constitute a "qual-
ity education" for a child, and fewer for a system of public education.
At a minimum, the self-analysis forced upon public policy makers,
teachers, families, and students by procedural fairness in the school
classification process insures that schools will begin to attend precisely
to real rather than imagined needs. The entire system of delivering
educational services will become the subject of special attention. As
a matter of public policy, that seems the best way to insure that no
child is denied a minimally adequate education.12 6
Such a procedural road to securing a minimally adequate educa-
tion for every child avoids substituting the judiciary as the schoolmas-
ters for the children of the nation. The court never has to define what
an appropriate education is for any child. Rather, all the present par-
126. Any argument that the state need not accord procedural fairness because of
the cost involved should be summarily dismissed. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
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ties to the process of educating students are required only to treat the
children served with fairness and due deliberation. Judicial action be-
gins and ends with determining fair procedure and enforcing the right
to some education. Previously unexamined and often arbitrary classi-
fication decisions are thereby made justiciable, and by a hearing officer
instead of a court. As a matter of constitutional adjudication, that
process seems the best way to insure that no child is denied a minimally
adequate education.
School issues which formerly were hidden to all-along with hun-
dreds of thousands of youngsters who, by any standard, were receiving
no education or total miseducation-are brought to public attention
by the judicial establishment of such a right to education. 127  With
that revelation will also come the time to shift from the sterile inquiry
into "quality" and "inequality" in education and the general impact
of dollar inputs on school outcomes 128 to the uniquely individual pro-
cess of allocating old and new resources to real children. We might
even hope that the continuing inquiry required by these new procedures
will serve to inform the allocation of resources more fully than all the
political rhetoric, and nonsense, about "leveling," "lighthouse districts,"
"power-equalizing," "local control," and the like. It is through syste-
matic, state-wide procedures to serve every child fairly that we can be-
gin to know, and serve, every child's interests more fully. Procedure,
for a change, is a road to substantial reform of education for all our
children.'
29
127. Additional elements necessary to insure this result include (1) systematic
evaluation of substantially disproportionate assignment of any racial, ethnic, sexual, or
wealth group to a particular curriculum; (2) systematic evaluation of the post-school
effects of school decisions and programs, and (3) the opportunity for a family to
contest the propriety of a regular class placement annually. See Mass. H.B. 6184.
These three additional procedural safeguards would permit full reckoning with the new
dogma-that schools do not matter much in providing training for and access to "suc-
cess" after formal education ends-and society's responsibility to prepare each new
generation of children in an effective but nondiscriminatory fashion for a world never
before known.
128. Compare COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1969); CEN-
TER FOR EDUCATIONAL POLICY RESEARCH, EDUCATION AND INEQUALITY: PRELIMINARY
REPORT (1971), with GUTHRIE, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY (1971); JENCKS, INEQUALITY
(1972), and MOYNIHAN & MOSTELLER, ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
(1972).
129. Aside from the merits of his unholy trinity, perhaps even Professor Kurland
would agree that the constitutional right here postulated meets all three parts of his
two-thirds requirement for success, "for the Court's will to prevail beyond its effect on
the immediate parties to the lawsuit." Kurland, supra note 2, at 592. The apparent
foundation for Kurland's three criteria is the "dismal picture of what must be acknowl-
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The Substantive Right of an Education Appropriate
to the Child's Needs: A Somewhat Less Honest
Road to an Adequate Education, Supposedly
Suited to Each Child's Needs
In Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia, Judge
Waddy ordered, inter alia, "that no child eligible for a publicly sup-
ported education in the District of Columbia public schools shall be
excluded from a regular public school assignment . . . unless such
child is provided. . adequate alternative educationial services suited
to the child's needs."'130 It has been argued in the previous two sec-
tions that such an order is no more, and no less, than an alternative
statement of the constitutional rights to some education and procedural
fairness before placement in other than a regular class. An alternative
reading, however, is that such order constitutes a single substantive
right'3 ' to a minimally adequate education suited to the child's
needs. 13  This section will examine the potential impact of such a
"needs" standard and the constitutional bases for it.
As noted, the "needs" question originated with the early school
finance cases which sought, under an equal protection theory, to allo-
edged to be the Supreme Court's failure" with respect to the desegregation cases. Id.
at 594. The professor's judgement, however, was premature; he failed to gauge the
actual desegregation flowing from Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1 (1971); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); and
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Worse, his primary criteria
for success-public acquiescence-is an invitation to the Court to stay its hand, simply
because the unconstitutional conduct has public support. Such a view is anathema to
any concept of the supremacy of the Constitution and rule by law rather than fiat. See
Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 459 (1968); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
19 (1958); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955); School Segregation,
supra note 36.
130. 348 F. Supp. 866, 878.
131. The issue of whether this substantive right is more properly ascribed to a
new substantive due process rubric or the new equal protection, I want to leave to the
Constitutional pundits. See, e.g., Kurland, supra note 2, at 591; Michelman, supra
note 35, at 33. I feel constrained, however, to explore briefly those analytic gymnas-
tics; I feel free to do so because any actual differences matter not in the context of the
right to education articulated in this article.
132. A more probable source of the phrase used in the order, however, is
local law. Compare Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, (D.D.C. 1972), with
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-201 to 203 (1968); see chapter XI Board Rules 1.1, 14.1, 14.3;
cf. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343 F. Supp. 279,
302 (E.D. Pa. 1972), note 26 supra. Where local law is the source of the substan-
tive "needs" standard, the federal court is merely giving proper lip service to local
law. Cf. 343 F. Supp. at 297. As discussed in the text, however, the invocation of
the "needs" requirement adds little of substance beyond glamorous semantics. See
notes 133-148 and accompanying text infra.
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cate revenues within a state among school districts in accord with the
differing aggregate needs of students in different school districts.' 33
Relief was denied in these cases, assertedly on the ground that there
was no manageable standard by which any court could determine what
differential revenues were required to finance an educational program
suited to the differing needs of various school districts.' The validity
of such a judgment is not here questioned: as educators cannot now,
and likely never will uncover the relationship between dollar inputs
in schooling and achievement test scores, actual learning, and success
after graduation, the courts should not be expected to be able to invent
the answer.
1 35
Nonetheless, it is worth repeating that any concern over the pre-
cise allocation of dollars to fit the aggregate, or individual, needs of
students is basically irrelevant to the constitutional right to education,
no matter how framed. In the context of the individual's right to an
education, even a substantive "needs" requirement can only be imple-
mented by individual evaluations, assignment to a "special" program,
re-evaluation of the individual's needs and effectiveness of the pro-
gram, and appropriate reassignment. The issue, therefore, is not an
abstract allocation of dollars among districts or even schools, but an
appropriate matching of the individual child to a specific program of
education. Hence, the only issue raised by the alternative statement
of the right to education is whether this process is required primarily
by constitutional guarantee of fair procedure or a substantive right
to education suited to the child's needs. In most school contexts the
source and statement of the right to education does not alter the actual
impact of judicial intervention into school affairs and the fate of chil-
dren.
Constitutional Bases of the Needs Standard
There are three interrelated bases for the substantive right to ed-
ucation suited to the child's needs: (1) "minimum protection," (per-
haps more properly labeled the new, old substantive due process or
the new, new equal protection);'36 (2) a constitutionally guaranteed
133. See McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Kurland, supra
note 2, at 583; notes 46 & 89 supra.
134. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 329-31 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
135. That does not, however, mean that courts cannot promulgate and enforce
other manageable standards affecting resource allocation, and more important aspects
of education. See Serrano, supra note 46, at 133; School Segregation, supra note 36,
at 15-20.
136. Cf. Michelman, supra note 35, at 33-39.
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benefit of adequate education to justify the massive, compulsory inter-
vention that schooling is in the child's life;lar and (3) the new equal
protection. 138  Professor Michelman argues that the Supreme Court's
actual "new" concern (at least during the Warren stewardship) is with
the establishment of those minimum standards necessary to insure ac-
cess to the means of minimally satisfying certain "basic wants."' 39 The
concern is with deprivation not discrimination, provision not equali-
zation.140  This concern for "minimum protection" finds its roots as
much in substantive due process-unconscionable deprivation of "life,
liberty or property"--as in equal protection. Hence, education, with
its compulsory overtones and as an aspect of First Amendment free-
doms, becomes an obvious candidate as a "basic want" in the scheme
of the minimum protectionist. After all, the state's massive restraint
on a child's liberty, by compelling attendance upon school for six hours
a day, 180 days a year, for up to ten years, can only be justified
if some minimal benefit is guaranteed to flow therefrom.
That concern merges into the second basis for the substantive con-
stitutional right to adequate education suited to the child's needs: if
criminals in penitentiaries are entitled to minimal standards of rehabili-
tation' 41 and if unfortunate persons "civilly" committed involuntarily
to various state institutions 1 2 are entitled to minimal standards of care
137. Cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
138. COONS, supra note 33, at 320; Developments in the Law-Equal Protection,
82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1183 (1969).
139. Michelman, supra note 35, at 13. See also Kurland, supra note 2, at 591;
cases cited note 40 supra (Justice Harlan's emerging view).
140. Professor Michelman, however, accepts that both deprivation and provision
are determined, at least in part, by a comparison with what the rest of society has, or
can afford; hence, what constitutes "minimum" protection does not purport wholly to
avoid concern for equality.
141. Cf. Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Wayne County
Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Bd. of Comm'rs. No. 173217 (Mich. Cir. CL May 25,
1971), 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 108 (June 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. Ark. 1970). This emerging right "to be free from harm" may apply to any
person in any state institution, even if commitment is in some sense "voluntary."
See New York State Ass'n for Retarded v. Rockefeller, Civil No. 72-356 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). In terms of actual relief, such a negative right may lead to relief more nearly
targeted to the constitutional wrong than an affirmative "right to treatment?' theory.
Cf. note 142 infra.
142. Cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala.
1972): "Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent
treatment, the hospital is transformed 'into a penitentiary where one could be indefi-
nitely convicted for no offense.' [Citations omitted]. The purpose of involuntary
hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care or pun-
ishment. This is the only justification, from a constitutional standpoint, that allows
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and treatment, so too, the innocent child committed to a minimum
ten year sentence of school should be entitled to a benefit: an adequate
education regardless of different abilities and capacities. That concern
merges into the fundamentality and suspect classification inquires of
the new equal protection: where education-a good so fundamental
as to be made compulsory-is to be meted out differentially on the
basis of stigmatizing classifications, it must be done so that the chil-
dren are provided an education sufficiently tailored to the child's needs
as to guarantee some minimal benefit.
143
Potential Impact of Establishment of a Substantive Right to
Education Suited to the Child's Needs
As educators now have little capacity to set specific minimum
standards for what constitutes an adequate education for every child.
courts should be careful about framing decrees which set affirmative
minimum standards, based either on resource input or measured out-
come for the child.144  Moreover, a general order to provide a mini-
mally adequate education tailored to the child's needs imposes no
greater duty on school authorities than a requirement to act in "good
faith" and rationally in the fair process commanded by the Constitu-
tion for school classification. In particular cases, however, the fair
process of school classification may reveal educational practices so il-
legitimate, inequitable, or racially discriminatory as to require further
judicial redress in the specific controversy.
civil commitments to mental institutions .... ." Because the only constitutional jus-
tification for civilly committing a mental retardate, therefore, is habilitation, it follows
that once committed, such person is possessed of an inviolable constitutional right to
rehabilitation. Stated another way, absent such rehabilitation and education, civil com-
mitment, or arguably compulsory education, is punishment for a "status" without
proof of any overt, proscribed act, unconstitutional under Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1961).
143. As Professor Michelnan has suggested, however, "there is a strong ducks-
and-drakes element in this approach, since nothing seems to prevent the legislature
from simply abandoning compulsory attendance." (Draft on file with Paul R. Di-
mond.)
144. The lack of standards for education generally may not be present in the con-
text of adequate care and treatment in the institutional setting: there, minimal stand-
ards are both essential and more capable of present promulgation. Cf. Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1972). Moreover, in the school setting, with
respect to specific physical, psychiatric and medical disorders which can be treated, a
similar situation may exist. See note 19 supra.
Finally, recent developments do suggest that specific programs of education and
training, which provide measurable benefits, can be matched on a fairly regular basis
with many of the most severely handicapped exceptional children. Absent other (or
new) proof, however, I still happen to believe that education is mostly hard work, art,
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In that respect Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools1 45 is instruc-
tive. Initially, the district court commanded that a hearing be accorded
the student before expulsion for distributing an underground newspa-
per which contained a few swear words. School authorities dutifully
held a hearing and expelled the student. Yet the hearing revealed that
other literature in the school library and curriculum contained the same
swear words used for the same purpose, although with an arguably
different effect on some of their infrequent readers, especially the school
administrators and school board. Upon reapplication to the court, the
judge found the grounds for the dismissal so arbitrary as to be insufficient
to justify the expulsion and ordered the student reinstated.
A similar process of examining the substance of school classifica-
tions is the primary modus operandi of both the "substantive" and pro-
cedural" articulation of the right to education. There is no significant
difference in actual impact on the process or substance of school classi-
fication: in both, the process of school classification remains the ve-
hicle, admittedly imperfect-but eventually self-correcting-to provide
an adequate education for each child. The substantive right "needs"
approach merely aggrandizes the more modestly stated right to some
education. Under either statement the individualized process may re-
veal circumstances which show that the child's present or contemplated
placement either totally deprives him of education or makes him the
subject of total miseducation. 146  If the school authorities and the hear-
ing officer fail to act upon such evidence, redress may still be obtained,
on a case by case basis, from the court, with continuing jurisdiction,
under either standard.
147
politics, association and, at times hopefully, a little joy. None of these are likely sub-
jects for specific substantive guidelines which can be generalized by the court. (Some
of my concerns with respect to constitutional adjudication of the adequacy issue may
not be as relevant to state court actions sounding in tort on behalf of individual chil-
dren. In these actions, although the end result may be pressure on school authorities
to provide more adequate education, the judicial intervention is limited to imposing
damages for the failure to provide children with the minimal skills requisite to ex-
istence at this time and implicitly or explicitly promised by the state compulsory sys-
tems of education.)
145. 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
146. See note 87, supra and note 147 infra.
147. Such cases, however, might have systematic effects. For example, consider
a possible decree requiring bilingual education in the case of a failure to provide any
education to children speaking only Spanish but taught only in English. See United
States v. T.E.A., C.A. No. 5281 (E.D. Tex., filed Dec. 6, 1971). Consider also a
possible decree requiring proportional representation on a racial basis in advanced
classes upon a showing that existing substantial disproportion is not adequately justi-
fied by nonracially discriminatory reasons. Cf. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282,
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Operationally, therefore, the distinction between the substantive
right to adequate education suited to the child's needs, as compared
with fair procedure coupled with the right to some education, is with-
out real difference. In such circumstances the sounder, more honest
jurisprudential course for the court is to trumpet the less glamorous
procedural right; this course is preferable to aggrandizing a somewhat
chimerical substantive right to an education suited to every child's
needs, whose success depends primarily on full implementation of pro-
cedural rights and enforcement of the right to some education. 14
8
Conclusion
The constitutional right to education will be formed by the judi-
cial establishment and enforcement of the right to some education and
292 n.8 (1971); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Finally, con-
sider the sweeping and salutary implications of combining this "procedural" approach
with a "substantive" attack on the segregation of children into separate residential
institutions, schools or even classes on the purported basis of, for example, mental re-
tardation, physical handicap, or speech impairment. To the extent that these class-
ifications are unrelated to actual handicap and have been used historically to subject a
definable class of politically powerless persons to unequal treatment and stigmatizing
isolation, they are "suspect," and the resulting segregation will be unconstitutional if
any less segregative alternative is available. See Burt, "Beyond the Right to Treat-
ment: Strategies for Judicial Action to Aid the Retarded," paper presented to Presi-
dent's Committee on Mental Retardation 1973 Conference, "The Mentally Retarded
Citizen and the Law"; Dimond, "Analysis of Right to Education and School Class-
ification Advocacy," paper presented to Organizational Meeting of the Children's
Defense Fund (both on file with Paul R. Dimond).
148. My concern over judicial restraint in this area-and the concern of others
with the efficacy of such a strictly procedural approach-may also be accommodated
by a second approach. What we are dealing with at this stage of the analysis is not so
much right as remedy: upon a showing of violation, how can an equity court insure
that every child has the opportunity of sone education (at least as long as the state
has made that opportunity generally available to others)? The trial court, as in school
desegregation cases, could therefore do the following: (1) require school authorities to
submit plans for implementation to eradicate the violation and all its effects on the
children affected and prevent its reoccurrence in the future; (2) permit plaintiffs to
submit objectives and propose alternatives; (3) hold a hearing on the plans; (4) order
or approve a plan; and (5) retain jurisdiction and require filing of appropriate reports
to permit the parties to apply for further relief upon a showing of either the inade-
quacy of the plan or changed circumstances. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Such an approach is familiar to the judiciary and litigants but has not yet been tried
generally in the area of school classification here discussed. It permits attention to
the circumstances of each locality and case and requires an appropriate reconciliation
-on a case by case basis-of the concerns over judicial restraint and complete relief.




the procedural due process rights to hearing prior to placement, peri-
odic review, and ascertainable standards tailored to the special cir-
cumstances and importance of school classifications. That constitu-
tional right to education will provide each family with the realistic op-
portunity to fight meaningfully for a decent education for each of their
children. The process established is individual and can recognize
and serve individual differences, all in the context of the essential simi-
larity of each child as a potentially functioning human and responsible
citizen.
The constitutional right to education will also enable schoolmen
and the body politic to inform the many educational, political, and
fiscal decisions which abound in schooling by collective learning from
individual hearings. Each state will be forced to confront both diverse
needs and yet deal effectively with the capacity of each child. Families
will have a weapon more powerful than the ballot box, "community
control," and "free choice" over all aspects of schooling: they are guar-
anteed treatment as clients-in the highest sense of the word-who
must be served fairly, openly and well rather than ruled.
Beyond that, it is conceivable that the consumers of educational
services will join forces, not only to insure the effective operation of
the hearing process for each child, but collectively 4 ' to reform the
political substance of schooling and pass a new culture, or test of cul-
ture, to the next generation of children. By focusing on the right to
education of those children who are arguably least capable, we might
even begin to accept the vast potential in every child. After all, almost
every child can learn to use and respond to symbols, even speak: that
feat is greater than any other known to mankind, yet it is within the
grasp of almost every child. When we begin to understand the capa-
city of every child for development, we may even begin to learn that
character, not I.Q., matters most on the job, at the capitol, and in
the schoolhouse, as well as at home. By finally serving those who
have been called ineducable by our schoolmasters heretofore, we may
all gain a little wisdom, and a better system of schooling.
149. Cf. Dimond, Toward a Children's Defense Fund, 41 HAv. ED. REV. 386
(1971); Cohen & Dimond, Protecting the Family's Interest in Public Schooling
(1971 OE Study CG-8542-A/1); Edelman & Dimond, Grant Proposal, "Children's
Defense Fund" (1972).
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